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SUBJECT:DISCUSSION PAPER FOR MAY 24-27 APAG MEETING

- - - - - - - NATO APAG MEETING MAY 24-27, 1977 - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - US DISCUSSION PAPER ON - - - - - - - - -

- - - - - - - - - - EAST-WEST RELATIONS: - - - - - - - - - -

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- - - - - - - - - - AGENDA AND PRIORITIES - - - - - - - - -

NOTE: THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED FOR DISCUSSION AND DOES NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE OFFICIAL VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE POST-WAR ERA HAS BEEN SHAPED BY FOUR MAIN FACTORS: THE RIVALRY ARISING FROM THE CONTRASTING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND IDEOLOGICAL SYSTEMS OF EAST AND WEST; THE ADVENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; THE DRAMATIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THE THIRD WORLD AND TRANSFORMATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (UNCONSTRAINED AND VIGOROUS IN THE WEST, REPRESSED AND UNCERTAIN IN THE EAST); AND THE

RECOGNITION BY EAST AND WEST OF THE NEED TO LIMIT AND REGULATE THEIR COMPETITION BY SOME RESTRAINT IN INTER-NATIONAL CONDUCT AND BY NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO PARTIAL AGREEMENTS. THE DETENTE PROCESS HAS PRODUCED A LIMITED ALBEIT IMPORTANT MODUS VIVENDI RATHER THAN A QUALITA-TIVE CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

2. WE ARE TRYING NOW TO MOVE BEYOND THE PRACTICAL UNDER-STANDINGS OF THE INITIAL ICE-BREAKING PHASE AND TO NEGOTIATE ACTUAL REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY FORCES AND ARMAMENTS; REGULATE EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD; AND TO SEEK IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC-
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TICES. MAJOR ADVANCES ON THESE CRITICAL ISSUES WILL CUT INCREASINGLY CLOSER TO THE VITAL INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES.

3. NEW DEVELOPMENTS HAVE ARISEN SINCE APAG CONSIDERED THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP LAST YEAR IN COPENHAGEN. A NEW US ADMINISTRATION HAS TAKEN OFFICE AND ATTACHES INCREASED PRIORITY TO
SIGNIFICANT ARMS REDUCTIONS; TO THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AROUND THE WORLD; AND TO THE PLACE OF MORE EQUITABLE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS IN A STABLE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS ARE TAKING A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH ON EAST-WEST ISSUES AND A DEFENSIVE POSTURE ON THE IMPENDING BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE; SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN INDEBTEDNESS GROWS AND POSSIBLE INSTABILITY LOOMS IN EASTERN EUROPE; AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION IS A POTENTIAL SLOWING FACTOR. EAST-WEST RELATIONS ALSO COULD BE COMPLICATED BY POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY IN CHINA, THE THREAT OF WAR IN

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THE MIDEAST, AND THE REALITY OF GROWING CONFLICT IN PARTS OF AFRICA.

4. NONETHELESS, BOTH EAST AND WEST CONTINUE TO HAVE STRONG INCENTIVES FOR MAINTAINING AND FURTHER DEVELOPING THEIR DIVERSE RELATIONSHIP. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET-UNION

SHARES OUR INTEREST IN REDUCING THE DANGER OF WAR AND REGULATING THE MILITARY COMPETITION. THE SOVIETS ALSO WISH TO USE THE DETENTE PROCESS TO DERIVE ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM THE WEST; TO MAINTAIN A PEACEFUL WESTERN FRONT AT A TIME OF CONTINUED TENSION WITH CHINA; AND TO ENHANCE THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE. MOSCOW SEEKS TO PURSUE THESE AIMS WHILE EXPANDING ITS INFLUENCE IN THE MIDEAST AND AFRICA.

5. THE CENTRAL CONCLUSION FOR WESTERN POLICY IN THE CONFIDENTIAL

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COMING PERIOD IS TO CAPITALIZE ON THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND CONDITIONS ALREADY CREATED BY THE EAST-WEST PROCESS IN

ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOVEMENT AND MAKE FURTHER CONCRETE PROGRESS; AND TO CHECK PRESSURES, HERE AND IN MOSCOW, THAT COULD PRODUCE PIECEMEAL EROSION AND EVEN A DOWN-WARD ACTION/REACTION CYCLE REVERTING ULTIMATELY TO CONFRONTATION.

6. THIS PAPER PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN CATEGORIES OF THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE--ARMS CONTROL, EUROPEAN SECURITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, ECONOMIC RELATIONS, AND THIRD WORLD CRISIS AREAS--AND SUGGESTS SOME PRIORITIES FOR ALLIED POLICY.

II. EAST-WEST OBJECTIVES

7. A SURVEY OF KEY EAST-WEST GOALS INDICATES SOME IMPORTANT PARALLEL INTERESTS BUT ALSO SIGNIFICANT DICHOTOMIES AND EVEN SHARP CLASHES OF INTEREST AND AIMS. THE TASK OF EAST-WEST DIPLOMACY IS TO SEEK, WITHIN THE EXISTING REALITIES AND CONSTRAINTS, TO MITIGATE AND BRIDGE DIVERGENCIES AND TO PROMOTE AND BUILD ON AREAS OF OVERLAPPING INTERESTS. THE JUXTAPOSITION OF SOME EAST-WEST INTERESTS AND AIMS MAY BE VIEWED IN BROAD GRAPHIC TERMS IN THE FOLLOWING CHART:

- - WESTERN AIMS - - - - - - - - - SOVIET AIMS - - - - -

A. NUCLEAR (AND CONVEN- TIONAL)ARMS CONTROL AND

A. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, PRESERVATION OF MILITARY

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AVOID UNRESTRAINED SOVIET POWER POSITION AND AVOID
MILITARY BUILDUP. MAJOR US/ALLIED MILITARY

B. CONTINUED WESTERN ECON- B. MAINTAIN EAST EUROPEAN
OMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS; STABILITY AND DISCIPLINE
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EUROPEAN STABILITY AND UNDER SOVIET GUIDANCE. BLOCK
SECURITY; AND ALLIANCE WESTERN INTRUSION IN SOVIET
COHESION. PREVENT SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN INTERNAL
COERCION OR INTRUSION IN AFFAIRS.
WESTERN INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

C. STRENGTHEN CONTACTS WITH C. EXTEND INFLUENCE IN WEST-
EAST EUROPEANS TO DIMINISH ERN EUROPE--AND ESPECIALLY
DIVISION OF CONTINENT; IN FRG AND BERLIN.
ENHANCE EAST EUROPEAN FREE-
DOM OF ACTION; AND REDUCE
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MILI-
TARY INTERVENTION. EXTEND
HUMAN RIGHTS IN RUSSIA AND
EAST EUROPE.

ESTERN AIMS - - - - - - - - - SOVIET AIMS - - - -
WESTERN AIMS - - - - - - - - - SOVIET AIMS - - - -

D- BROADEN TRADE AND GEN- D. OBTAIN MFN TREATMENT,
ERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS COMMERCIAL CREDITS AND
WITH USSR AND EASTERN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER.
EUROPE.

E. PROMOTE PROGRESS AND E. ENHANCE SOVIET GLOBAL
STABILITY IN THIRD WORLD; STATUS AND INFLUENCE,
ENHANCE SOVIET RESTRAINT ESPECIALLY IN MIDEAST, AND
IN THIRD WORLD. ALSO IN AFRICA AND ASIA.

F. EXPAND RELATIONS WITH F. INHIBIT SINO-AMERICAN
CHINA FOR BENEFITS TO DETENTE, CHECK SPREAD OF
REGIONAL ASIAN PEACE AND CHINESE INFLUENCE AND EN-
STABILITY AND AS BALANCE COURAGE LEADERSHIP MORE
AGAINST PROSPECTIVE FRIENDLY TO SOVIETS IN
AMELIORATION OF SINO- PEKING.
SOVIET RELATIONS.
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G. CONTINUE EAST-WEST COMPE- G. CONTINUE EAST-WEST COMPE-
TITION BUT AT A LESS TITION WITHOUT RISKING
DANGEROUS LEVEL. US-SOVIET WAR.

III. AGENDA AND PRIORITIES

A. ARMS CONTROL

8. THE OVERRIDING ALLIED OBJECTIVE IN EAST-WEST RELA-
TIONS IS TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR, TO PROMOTE STRATEGIC
STABILITY AND CALCULABILITY AND TO EXTEND POLITICAL
CONTROL OVER THE ARMS RACE. THIS MUST BE DONE IN A WAY
THAT PRESERVES ALLIED SECURITY AND FREEDOM FROM COERCION.

9. THERE IS NO DENYING THE GEO-POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF
THE SOVIET ATTAINMENT OF OVERALL STRATEGIC PARITY.
THE IMPRESSIVE SOVIET STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM,
SINCE THE 1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS,IS OF KEY IMPORTANCE
IN ASSESSING THE ALLIED POLICIES NEEDED TO ACHIEVE
THESE OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIET BUILD-UP IN STRATEGIC
AND THEATER CAPABILITIES HAS BEEN A STEADY RATHER THAN
SUDDEN ONE, TIED IN PART TO THE POST-WAR DYNAMICS OF
THE US-SOVIET ACTION/REACTION CYCLE.

10. WE WILL NEED TO CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT NATO MILITARY
STRENGTH IS SUFFICIENT TO DETER AND, IF NECESSARY, DEFEND
AGAINST SOVIET ATTACK ON THE WEST. IN ADDITION TO
MAINTENANCE OF A STRONG NATO DEFENSE, ALLIED SECURITY

CAN ALSO BE ENHANCED THROUGH CONCRETE AND VERIFIABLE ARMS
CONTROL MEASURES. GIVEN THE REALITIES OF THE NUCLEAR AGE,
THE USSR ALSO HAS A MAJOR INTEREST IN WAR AVOIDANCE AND
STRATEGIC STABILITY.

-- STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS
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11. SALT CONSTITUTES THE HEART OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS.
WHILE SALT HAS HARDLY SWEPT AWAY THE DANGERS OF THE NUCLEAR
AGE, IT HAS REPRESENTED A TANGIBLE EARNEST OF THE SUPER-
POWERS' WISH TO SET LIMITS ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

12. OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO DATE IS THE ABM TREATY WHICH
LIMITED ABM DEVELOPMENTS TO LOW LEVELS AND THEREBY EFFEC-
TIVELY CONSTRAINED A POTENTIALLY MAJOR CHALLENGE TO THE
RETALIATORY CAPABILITY OF BOTH SIDES, WHICH IS THE FOUNDA-
TION OF DETERRENCE. THIS REMOVED ONE MAJOR MILITARY
INCENTIVE FOR PURSUING THE EVER LARGER LEVELS OF OFFENSIVE
FORCES. THE RESULT HAS BEEN A SIGNIFICANT ENHANCEMENT OF

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STRATEGIC STABILITY.

13. HOWEVER, NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS (SUCH AS IMPROVED MISSILE ACCURACY) AND CONTINUED DEPLOYMENTS OF IMPROVED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CAN THREATEN SUCH STABILITY, AND, MORE BROADLY, CAN INCREASE OVERALL POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY. CONTINUED COMMITMENT AND FURTHER APPROACHES WILL BE REQUIRED BY BOTH SIDES IN CURRENT AND FUTURE ROUNDS OF DISCUSSIONS TO MAINTAIN AND ENHANCE STABILITY.

14. CONCLUSION OF A VLADIVOSTOK-TYPE AGREEMENT WOULD CONTRIBUTE FURTHER TO STRATEGIC STABILITY BECAUSE THE SETTING OF OFFENSIVE CEILINGS AT A DEFINITE LEVEL WOULD MEAN THAT EACH SIDE'S PERCEPTION OF THE OTHER'S FUTURE STRENGTH WOULD BE BASED ON A CODIFIED EQUAL AGGREGATE RATHER THAN ON WORST CASE PROJECTIONS OF FUTURE CAPABILITIES. MOREOVER, THE VLADIVOSTOK AGGREGATE CEILING WOULD PROVIDE A BASIS FOR PROMPT FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATION OF SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS.

15. WHILE THE US HAS OFFERED TO CONCLUDE A VLADIVOSTOK-TYPE AGREEMENT, WHILE DEFERRING CRUISE MISSILE AND BACKFIRE CONSTRAINTS FOR FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, WE PREFER TO MOVE IMMEDIATELY TO REDUCTIONS OF AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON
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STRATEGIC WEAPONS SO THAT THE ARMS RACE DOES NOT CONTINUE TO OUTPACE ARMS CONTROL. A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT COULD INCLUDE, INTER ALIA, SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE OVERALL AGGREGATE OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES;
REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF BOTH

MIRVED SYSTEMS AND MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS; A BAN ON MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING ICBM'S;
AND A LIMIT ON ICBM LAUNCHERS EQUIPPED WITH MIRV'S. IT WOULD ALSO INCLUDE LIMITS ON CRUISE MISSILES, A SUBJECT ON WHICH ALLIES ALREADY ARE EXCHANGING VIEWS. THIS COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, HOWEVER, ALSO ENTAILS DILEMMAS FOR THE ALLIANCE. IN REACTION TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILINGS, THE SOVIETS HAVE AGAIN RAISED THE FBS ISSUE AND MAY STIFFEN THE SOVIET POSITION ON NON-TRANSFER. WE HAVE REJECTED THIS APPROACH AND WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE ALLIES ON ALL ASPECTS OF SALT.

16. OUR LONGER-TERM GOAL IS THE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, CONSISTENT WITH ALLIED SECURITY. IN ANY CASE, CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY SALT TWO AGREEMENT WOULD REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTY HANGING OVER CURRENT EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND PROVIDE A STRONG IMPULSE FOR OTHER ARMS CONTROL AND EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS.

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-- RELATED ISSUES

17. THE EAST-WEST ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE HAS BROUGHT FORTH MANY IDEAS OVER THE LAST DECADE, SOME FLOWING DIRECTLY FROM THE SALT PROCESS; OTHERS RESULTING FROM EARLIER AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE 1963 TEST BAN TREATY AND 1967 NPT; AND STILL OTHERS FROM THE ONGOING CCD DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA. SOME OF THESE IDEAS, SUCH AS NUCLEAR NON-FIRST USE AND "MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPON" PROPOSALS, HAVE BEEN ADVANCED BY THE EAST IN THE KNOWLEDGE
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THAT THEY ARE PATENTLY UNACCEPTABLE TO NATO.

18. WE BELIEVE THE TIME IS NOW RIPE FOR PROFITABLE NEGOTIATION, OR AT LEAST SERIOUS EXCHANGES OF VIEW, ON A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. TO EXPLORE THIS POSSIBILITY, THE US AND USSR HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH WORKING GROUPS IN THE AREAS OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BANS; CHEMICAL WEAPONS; PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MISSILE FIRINGS; ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS; CIVIL DEFENSE; MILITARY LIMITATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN; RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS; CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS; AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION.

19. SOME OF THESE SUBJECTS ARE INTIMATELY RELATED TO SALT; THE CTB AREA IS OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. NON-PROLIFERATION IS OF COURSE A GLOBAL ISSUE WHICH TRANSCENDS THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE. ALL THESE ISSUES BEAR ON ALLIED INTERESTS AND WE INTEND TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON

DISCUSSIONS IN THESE WORKING GROUPS. VIEWED TOGETHER, THE GROUPS COULD TRANSLATE THE MORE IMPORTANT IDEAS OF THE ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE INTO A POTENTIAL AGENDA FOR CONCRETE PROGRESS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THESE NEW INITIATIVES REFLECT THE US WISH TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC STABILITY AND OVERALL WESTERN SECURITY.

B. EUROPEAN SECURITY

-- MBFR

20. MBFR IS THE FIRST MAJOR POST-WAR EFFORT TO STABILIZE THE NATO/WP MILITARY BALANCE THROUGH ARMS CONTROL. GIVEN THE HIGHLY POLITICAL CHARACTER OF EAST-WEST INTERESTS AND OUR DEEPLY DIVERGENT AIMS IN THE VIENNA TALKS, MBFR ALSO FORMS A KIND OF CONCEPTUAL BRIDGE BETWEEN THE ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY COMPONENTS OF THE DETENTE AGENDA.
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21. THE CENTRAL ALLIED INTEREST IN MBFR IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A STABLE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE WHICH WILL BE UNDERSTANDABLE TO AND SUSTAINABLE BY WESTERN PUBLICS AND PARLIAMENTS OVER THE LONG-TERM. THIS REQUIRES THE PRESENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL US FORCES IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF ALLIED FORCE LEVELS ADEQUATE FOR DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE. THE MAJOR ALLIED OPERATIONAL AIM IS TO REDUCE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL QUANTITATIVE GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH PRESENTLY EXCEEDS 150,000 SOLDIERS AND 9,500 TANKS, WHILE LIMITING THE IMPACT OF MBFR ON NATO CAPABILITIES.

22. THE CENTRAL SOVIET INTEREST IN MBFR IS FORMALLY TO LIMIT, AND ACHIEVE A LEGAL BASIS FOR MONITORING, THE SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF WEST GERMAN FORCES AND TO BRING ABOUT THE PROGRESSIVE US DISENGAGEMENT FROM THE CONTIN-ENTAL SECURITY STRUCTURE. SOVIET OPERATIONAL AIMS ARE: TO OBTAIN RESTRICTIVE NATIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON WEST EUROPEAN AND ESPECIALLY BUNDESWEHR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS; TO CODIFY EXISTING EASTERN GROUND FORCE ADVANTAGES; AND TO INITIATE AN ORDERLY DETACHMENT OF US MILITARY FORCES FROM WESTERN EUROPE.

23. THE US IS DETERMINED TO MAKE THE EFFORT, TOGETHER WITH ITS ALLIES, TO GET MBFR OUT OF THE DOLDRUMS. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT A POLITICAL PUSH FROM BOTH SIDES IS GOING TO BE NECESSARY. IF PROGRESS IS TO BE MADE IN VIENNA, IT WILL NOT BE PURCHASED ALONG THE ROAD OF UNILATERAL WESTERN CONCESSIONS. THE EAST OWES US A

RESPONSE TO THE MAJOR OFFER CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PLACED ON THE TABLE IN DECEMBER 1975. THAT OFFER HAS BEEN THE ONLY MAJOR NEW ELEMENT ADVANCED BY EITHER SIDE SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE TALKS.
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24. FROM THE WESTERN STANDPOINT, THE PRINCIPLES OF APPROXIMATE PARITY OF OUTCOME AND COLLECTIVITY OF OBLIGA-TION ARE THE KEY MEASURING RODS OF AN ACCEPTABLE AGREE-MENT. SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF THE COLLECTIVITY PRINCIPLE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT AS IT WOULD REMOVE A MAJOR DANGER TO ALLIED INTERESTS. THIS COULD FACILITATE

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DETAILED DISCUSSION OF DATA AND LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF PHASING ISSUES. IN THIS PERSPECTIVE, AND GIVEN A SIGNIFICANT EASTERN MOVE IN THE PERIOD AHEAD, THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER HOW BEST TO MOVE MBFR WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING BASIC WESTERN INTERESTS.

-- GERMANY AND BERLIN

25. THE 1972 BERLIN QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT HAS REDUCED TENSIONS IN THAT FORMER CRISIS POINT, BUT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO PRESS THEIR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT AND THERE ARE CONTINUED DISAGREEMENTS OVER SUCH ISSUES AS FRG-WEST BERLIN TIES AND THE REPRESENTATION OF WEST BERLIN ABROAD BY THE FRG. WE DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS THROUGH THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DIPLOMATIC MANAGEMENT PROVIDED IN THE AGREEMENT. THE KEY TO THIS DIPLOMATIC MANAGEMENT PROBLEM IS THE CONTINUED ENGAGEMENT BY THE US, UK, AND FRANCE; INTIMATE AND TIMELY CONSULTATIONS IN THE BONN GROUP; AND THE STRONG SUPPORT OF THE NATO ALLIES.

26. THE MOST RECENT SPECIFIC EXAMPLE OF SOVIET/GDR "SALAMI TACTICS" OCCURRED IN LATE 1976, WHEN THE EAST GERMANS REMOVED SOME OF THE REMAINING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND THE REST OF THE GDR. A MAJOR POSSIBLE NEXT STEP COULD BE GDR ACTION AGAINST FREE MOVEMENT BY MEMBERS OF ALLIED GARRISONS THROUGHOUT EAST BERLIN. SUCH A STEP WOULD THREATEN A MAJOR UNDERPINNING OF "OUR POWER RESPONSIBILITIES FOR BOTH EAST AND
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WEST BERLIN. IF THE FOUR POWER STATUS CAME TO APPLY ONLY TO WEST BERLIN, THE SOVIETS COULD CLAIM THAT THE WARTIME AND POSTWAR AGREEMENTS WERE INVALIDATED BY THE REMOVAL OF BOTH EAST GERMANY AND EAST BERLIN FROM OCCUPATION STATUS. THE SOVIETS THEN COULD ALSO CLAIM A LARGER ROLE IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE WESTERN SECTORS.

27. SUCH RESULTS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD SUCH A CHALLENGE EMERGE, THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE MADE TO UNDERSTAND ON A TIMELY BASIS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY A HIGH POLITICAL PRICE FOR SUCH ACTIONS, BOTH IN TERMS OF THE SPECIFIC SITUATION IN BERLIN AND THE OVERALL STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. CONTINUED STABILITY OF THE SITUATION IN GERMANY AND BERLIN REMAIN SINE QUA NON OF IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE.

-- EASTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

28. WHILE DETENTE HAS BROUGHT ABOUT INCREASED WESTERN

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CONTACTS WITH EASTERN EUROPE, IT HAS HAD ONLY A MODEST TANGIBLE EFFECT ON SOVIET CONTROL OVER THAT REGION; ON THE POST-WAR DE FACTO DIVISION OF EUROPE; AND ON THE INTERNAL DISCIPLINE OF THE EAST EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR MUCH OF CURRENT WESTERN SKEPTICISM CONCERNING EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

29. THE KREMLIN CONSIDERS A STABLE, OBEDIENT EAST EUROPEAN BUFFER ZONE, REASONABLY FREE OF WESTERN INFLUENCE, TO BE ESSENTIAL TO SOVIET SECURITY. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY TO THE GDR. WHILE RELATIVELY QUIESCENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1968 CZECHOSLOVAK INVASION, EAST GERMANY AND THE REGIMES OF EAST EUROPE REMAIN INHERENTLY UNSTABLE AND POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE ULTIMATE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN EAST EUROPEAN NATIONALISM AND RUSSIAN CONTROL. MOSCOW THEREFORE HAS LIMITED TOLERANCE FOR EITHER "DE-
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STALINIZATION" OR "DE-SATELLIZATION."

30. IN THIS SITUATION, THE SOVIET-GDR TREATY, ASSERTING A SOVIET RIGHT TO DEFEND THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH (BREZHNEV DOCTRINE), MAY BE AN OMINOUS FORESHADOWING OF FUTURE SOVIET COMPACTS WITH OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES. THE RUSSIANS ALSO ARE CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR TIGHTER ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN COMECON. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS SEEM INTENT, AS A COUNTER TO INCREASED EAST-WEST CONTACTS, ON TIGHTENING UP INTERNAL DISCIPLINE IN RUSSIA AND THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE.

31. NONETHELESS, THE ACTUAL EXERCISE OF CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE HAS NOT PROVEN TO BE EASY FOR MOSCOW. BEYOND THE BROADER FORCES OF NATIONALISM, EAST EUROPEAN INSTABILITY HAS BECOME AN INCREASINGLY ACUTE CONTINGENCY. THIS IS DUE TO THE ECONOMIC FACTOR, CSCE, AND THE EFFECTS OF "EUROCOMMUNISM" AND IDEOLOGICAL FERMENT.

32. THE ECONOMIC FACTOR. EAST EUROPEANS ARE STRAINING TO PAY FOR HIGHER-PRICED OIL AND OTHER IMPORTS FROM THE USSR AS WELL AS WESTERN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY, RAW MATERIALS, AND SEMIMANUFACTURES NECESSARY TO MODERNIZE AND EXPAND THEIR INDUSTRIES. THEIR IMPORT EARNINGS ARE FAR FROM ADEQUATE. THUS FAR, THE VERY LARGE GROWTH IN IMPORTS FROM THE WEST HAS BEEN FINANCED BY MASSIVE HARD CURRENCY BORROWING. EAST EUROPEAN HARD CURRENCY INDEBTEDNESS HAS RISEN IN THE PROCESS TO ABOUT $32 BILLION (AT YEAR-END 1976), AND THE DEBT SERVICE RATIOS OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES ARE BEING WATCHED CLOSELY BY CREDITORS. (SOVIET DEBT

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IS AN ADDITIONAL $14 BILLION.) THE WESTERN INFLATION/
RECESSION OF 1974/5 HAS CONTRIBUTED FURTHER TO THE SURGE
IN EAST EUROPEAN HARD CURRENCY TRADE DEFICITS. UNLESS
EAST EUROPEAN EXPORTS CAN BE GREATLY INCREASED, TRADE
WILL STAGNATE AND IT WILL BE DIFFICULT FOR THESE COUNTRIES
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TO SATISFY RISING CONSUMERS' EXPECTATIONS. THIS COULD
PRODUCE FURTHER POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN SOME EAST
EUROPEAN REGIMES, ESPECIALLY IN EAST GERMANY, HUNGARY,
POLAND, AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WHICH HAVE TRIED TO GAIN
POPULAR SUPPORT THROUGH THE SATISFACTION OF CONSUMER
DEMAND.

33. CSCE. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT PROVISIONS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT IN
EASTERN EUROPE, STIRRING SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN LEADER-
SHIP CONCERNS. THEY WERE CITED, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT ONLY
BY THE "CHARTER 77" DISSIDENTS IN PRAGUE, BUT ALSO BY THE
VAST MAJORITY OF THE ESTIMATED 100,000 OR MORE EAST
GERMANS WHO HAVE SOUGHT TO EMIGRATE LEGALLY TO THE WEST.

34. "EUROCOMMUNISM"/IDEOLOGICAL FERMENT. THE STANDS OF
THE ITALIAN, FRENCH, AND SPANISH COMMUNIST PARTIES, AND
THE POSITIONS OF THE YUGOSLAV AND ROMANIAN REGIMES,
HAVE HAD A MARKED EFFECT ON INTELLECTUALS AND MORE
INDEPENDENT-MINDED PARTY MEMBERS IN EASTERN EUROPE.
THESE DEVELOPMENTS, TOGETHER WITH THE OBVIOUS IRRELEVANCE
OF THE RULING IDEOLOGY--BOTH MORALLY AND IN TERMS OF
PRAGMATIC GOVERNING--ARE LIKELY TO BE AN IMPORTANT
SOURCE OF CONTINUING TENSION IN THE SOVIET UNION AND IN
EAST EUROPEAN STATES. THE AMBIGUOUS POLISH AND HUNGARIAN
APPRAISALS OF THE EUROCOMMUNIST PHENOMENON SUGGEST INTER-
NAL DEBATES IN THESE TWO PARTIES OVER THE ISSUES RAISED
BY WESTERN COMMUNIST PARTIES. THIS FERMENT SO FAR HAS
BEEN LIMITED LARGELY TO INTELLECTUALS AND GENERALLY
PRESENTS NO GENUINE SECURITY PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH SOME
WORKERS COMMITTEES HAVE JOINED WITH INTELLECTUALS IN
POLAND. HOWEVER, SOVIET WORRY ABOUT HOW SUCH IDEAS COULD

INFECT EAST EUROPEAN RULING PARTIES HAS CONTRIBUTED TO
MOSCOW'S RIGID ATTITUDE TOWARD CSCE IMPLEMENTATION.

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35. THESE FACTORS OF ECONOMIC DECLINE AND FRUSTRATED

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POLITICAL "POSSIBILITIES" HAVE INCREASED THE SENSE OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION IN EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES. AS A RESULT, THE NEXT DECADE MAY SEE A GENERAL RISE IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TENSIONS THERE. THESE OCCASIONALLY MAY TAKE THE FORM OF CIVIL DISTURBANCES, AS IN POLAND. THE MORE LIKELY PATTERN WILL BE ONE OF INCREASED PRESSURE ON THE PARTY LEADERSHIP BY ELITE GROUPS, BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE OF THE PARTY, TO PERMIT SOME DEVOLUTION OF POWER TO MORE "MODERN" ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY. SUCH LONG-TERM POLITICAL DYNAMICS WILL BE VIEWED WITH GREAT CONCERN IN MOSCOW.

36. WITH EASTERN EUROPE, AND AT HOME, SOVIET LEADERS ARE FACED WITH A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CPSU IMPERATIVE OF HEGEMONY AND THE RISING DEMANDS OF EQUALITY. BREZHNEV'S RESPONSE HAS BEEN A PRAGMATIC COMBINATION OF HOLDING TO A FIRM LINE WHERE POSSIBLE (E.G., EAST GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND BULGARIA) AND GRUDGING ACCEPTANCE OF GRADUAL REFORM OR AUTONOMY WHERE NECESSARY (E.G., POLAND/ HUNGARY; ROMANIA/ALBANIA). THE CPSU HAS TAKEN A SIMILAR TOUGH APPROACH DOMESTICALLY. TOWARD EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES--AS WITH SOVIET SOCIETY--THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS PREFERRED, WHERE NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE, TO SHIFT THE TERMS OF DEBATE AND CONFLICT FROM POLITICAL TO ECONOMIC MATTERS. IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE, CONSUMERISM AND ECONOMIC AID CONSTITUTE MAJOR EXPRESSIONS OF THIS STRATEGY. RECENT SOVIET AID TO POLAND, FOLLOWING THE JUNE 1976 PRICE RIOTS, IS A CASE IN POINT.

37. FROM A SOVIET STANDPOINT, THIS POLICY SUFFERS FROM TWO BASIC DEFECTS. FIRST, IT HAS NO NATURAL TERMINAL POINT. GRADUAL APPEASEMENT OF EAST EUROPEAN DEMANDS--ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, LIBERALIZATION, OR FOREIGN POLICY AUTONOMY--INEVITABLY FEEDS RATHER THAN SATIATES EAST EUROPEAN APPETITES. SECONDLY, WITH ITS OWN MAJOR ECONOMIC CONFIDENTIAL

PROBLEMS, THE USSR HAS NEITHER THE CAPACITY NOR THE DESIRE TO DIVERT SCARCE ECONOMIC RESOURCES FROM INTERNAL SOVIET REQUIREMENTS TO THE NEEDS OF MORE DEVELOPED EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES. MOREOVER, IT IS WESTERN TECHNOLOGY THAT IS MOST RELEVANT TO EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET ECONOMIC NEEDS.

38. THESE TWO FACTORS HAVE IMPORTANT RAMIFICATIONS FOR SOVIET/EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND CONSEQUENT WESTERN POLICY. THE DYNAMIC FEATURE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP OFFERS LONG-TERM HOPE TO EAST EUROPEANS AND POSES A LONG-TERM

THREAT TO TIGHT SOVIET CONTROL. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THE LIKELIHOOD OF OCCASIONAL ERUPTIONS WHEN EAST EUROPEAN

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HOPES AND SOVIET FEARS COLLIDE. THE TRIANGULAR POLITICAL-ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP ALSO POSES TOUGH POLICY CHOICES FOR THE WEST. WE WISH TO USE MFN, CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, AS WELL AS EXPANSION OF BILATERAL RELATIONS GENERALLY, TO DEEPEN AND IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. MOREOVER, BROADENING EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS CAN CONTRIBUTE TO OUR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. BUT WESTERN CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY ALSO CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOVIET CAPACITY TO MAINTAIN ITS HEGEMONIC POLITICAL POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND TO BUILD-UP ITS MILITARY FORCES. WE NEED TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE IN A WAY THAT PERMITS GREATER EAST-WEST ECONOMIC INTERCHANGE.

39. MORE BROADLY, ALLIED POLICY SHOULD AIM AT THE GRADUAL AND PROGRESSIVE MITIGATION OF THE RIGORS OF SOVIET HEGE-MONY OVER AND INTERNAL AUTHORITARIANISM IN EASTERN EUROPE, WITHOUT PROVOKING INSTABILITY. IN DOING THIS, WE SHOULD BE GUIDED BY OUR OWN INTERESTS, BUT ALSO IN PART BY EACH EAST EUROPEAN REGIME'S JUDGMENT OF ITS OWN POSSIBILITIES AND OF THE LIMITS OF SOVIET TOLERATION. THUS, IN THE EAST EUROPEAN SCENE, ALLIED POLICY IS OF NECESSITY VERY FINE TUNED AND TARGETTED AT INCREMENTAL OBJECTIVES.

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40. YUGOSLAVIA IS, OF COURSE, A SPECIAL CASE. OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVE REMAINS THE CONTINUED INDEPENDENCE OF YUGOSLAVIA FROM THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT ARMED INTERVENTION OR A BID FOR PREDOMINANT POLITICAL INFLUENCE DURING THE SUCCESSION PERIOD WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST EFFECT ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE MUST CONTINUE TO RESERVE ALL OUR OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO SUCH SOVIET ACTION.

41. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST TRADE AND APPROPRIATE WESTERN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS HAS ENORMOUS RELEVANCE AND APPEAL TO THE COMING EDUCATED GENERATION OF EAST EUROPEANS. IN TIME, EXPANSION OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS COULD LEAD TO SHIFTS IN TRADE PATTERNS AND TO SOME REDUCTION OF EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY ON MOSCOW; THIS HAS OCCURRED TO SOME EXTENT ALREADY IN ROMANIA AND POLAND. ON THE OTHER HAND, ALL EAST EUROPEAN STATES REMAIN FUNDA-MENTALLY DEPENDENT ON THE USSR FOR MARKETS AND FOR THE SUPPLY OF OIL AND OTHER RAW MATERIALS. HOWEVER TIGHT THE FUTURE SOVIET ECONOMIC AND PETROLEUM PINCH, MOSCOW IS UNLIKELY TO PERMIT THIS BASIC POLITICAL REALITY TO CHANGE. FINALLY, EAST EUROPEAN INDEBTEDNESS AND BLEAK EXPORT PROSPECTS POSE SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO SUSTAINED WESTERN COMMERCIAL CREDITS AND ALLIED COUNTRIES HAVE OTHER HIGHER

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PRIORITY DEMANDS ON THEIR LIMITED RESOURCES. (MANY OF THESE SAME CONSIDERATIONS APPLY TO ALLIED ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USSR.) IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OECD DISCUSSIONS ON THE HARMONIZATION OF WESTERN EXPORT CREDIT POLICY BE PURSUED.

42. SOVIET LEADERS ARE DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN OVERALL CONTROL IN EAST EUROPEAN POLITICS, THROUGH MILITARY FORCE IF NECESSARY. BUT THEY ALSO SEEK TO FEND OFF EAST EUROPEAN PRESSURES FOR CHANGE WITH PARTIAL CONCESSIONS. THE ALLIED TASK IS TO PRESS MOSCOW TO ENHANCE CONSIDERABLY
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THE SCOPE OF THOSE SO FAR MODEST CONCESSIONS. THIS STRATEGY AIMS TO INFLUENCE PROGRESSIVELY THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION OF EASTERN EUROPE WITHOUT CHALLENGING FRONTALLY VITAL SOVIET INTERESTS. THUS, WE REJECT SOVIET HEGEMONY IN PRINCIPLE AND WORK TO ENHANCE THE RANGE OF EAST EUROPEAN CHOICES. AND WHILE PRAGMATISM EXCLUDES A POLICY OF CONCERTED CONFRONTATION, WESTERN VALUES AND PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS REQUIRE THAT WE KEEP UP STEADY PRESSURE--AND BE SEEN BY OUR PUBLIC TO BE PRESSING HARD--FOR ADHERANCE TO ELEMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE NORMAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATES AND PEOPLES OF EAST AND WEST.

43. CSCE IS OUR MAIN INSTRUMENT FOR THE PURSUIT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES WITH BOTH RUSSIA AND EASTERN EUROPE. DESPITE TENACIOUS SOVIET EFFORTS, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT IS PROFOUNDLY AN INSTRUMENT OF WESTERN DIPLOMACY AND CONTAINS A LONG LIST OF SOVIET/EASTERNEUROPEANUNDERTAKINGS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND INFORMATION FIELDS. WHILE AMBIGUOUS AND "VOLUNTARY" IN CHARACTER, THESE COMMITMENTS ESTABLISH AN ACTION AGENDA WHICH WE AND OUR ALLIES SHOULD PRESS THE EAST TO IMPLEMENT. TO DATE, SOVIET COMPLIANCE HAS BEEN MINIMAL ESPECIALLY ON BASKET III, WITH MOSCOW SEEKING TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THIS RECORD WITH GRANDIOSE PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS. THE EAST EUROPEAN RECORD IS MORE VARIED--RANGING FROM THE MODERATE HUNGARIANS TO THE HARD-LINE CZECHOSLOVAKS AND EAST GERMANS, AND, IN THE FAMILY REUNIFICATION FIELD, TO TOUGH POSITIONS BY POLAND AND ROMANIA--BUT IN ANY CASE WITHIN THE BROAD CONFINES SET BY SOVIET POLICY.

44. ALLIED POLICY FOR THE BELGRADE REVIEW CONFERENCE IS WELL BALANCED. IT SEEKS PRIMARILY TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM FEASIBLE EASTERN IMPLEMENTATION WHILE INSULATING THE BROADER EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP FROM UNDUE FALLOUT. IT DOES NOT SEEK CONFRONTATION IN BELGRADE BUT ASSUMES THAT, IN THE ABSENCE OF MAJOR SOVIET PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTATION,
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THERE WILL BE EVIDENT AND UNAVOIDABLE DIFFERENCES. IT RECOGNIZES THAT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT WILL

NOT BE ACHIEVED EASILY OR SOON AND THUS LOOKS TO A FURTHER REVIEW CONFERENCE 2-3 YEARS AFTER BELGRADE TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE. IT FAVORS A LIMITED NUMBER OF CONCRETE NEW PROPOSALS TO MAINTAIN THE INITIATIVE AGAINST SOVIET PROPAGANDA PROPOSALS, AND TO SEEK FURTHER PROGRESS, ESPECIALLY IN THE BASKET III AREA. BUT IT IS HOSTILE TO A LARGE ARRAY OF GRANDIOSE NEW INITIATIVES THAT COULD DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM IMPLEMENTATION; TO ANOTHER FULL-SCALE CSCE; OR TO A POST-BELGRADE ALL-EUROPEAN POLITICAL COMMITTEE (OR A PLETHORA OF EXPERTS GROUPS) THAT COULD BE USED BY MOSCOW AS THE NUCLEUS FOR ITS LONG-TERM AIM OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM.

45. THE MESSAGE THAT GOES FORTH FROM BELGRADE SHOULD BE THAT A SLOW START HAS BEEN MADE IN TRANSLATING THE PROMISE OF HELSINKI INTO REALITY; THAT THE WEST IS DISAPPOINTED WITH PROGRESS TO DATE; THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED BUT WILL PERSIST IN PRESSING FOR FULL COMPLIANCE. THIS WILL PUT OUR EFFORTS IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE, IN EAST AND WEST, AND PLACE THE SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEAN AUTHORITIES ON NOTICE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL REMAIN AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE EAST-WEST ACTION AGENDA. MOST IMPORTANTLY, IT WILL RECONFIRM THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FINAL ACT, SIGNED BY 35 EUROPEAN LEADERS, AS THE MULTILATERAL BASIS FOR THIS HUMAN RIGHTS EFFORT. WHILE THIS INEVITABLY WILL ENTAIL A CONTINUED IRRITANT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE STRUCTURALLY CONTROLLED CSCE APPROACH HAS THE VIRTUE OF PROVIDING A DIPLOMATIC CHANNEL THROUGH WHICH PROGRESS CAN BE PURSUED WITHOUT LOSS OF FACE BY THE USSR OR MAJOR INSTABILITY IN THE EAST-WEST SCENE. IN SUM, OUR GOAL IN CSCE IS NOT CONFRONTATION BUT STEADY PROGRESS.

D. THIRD WORLD: THE EAST-WEST/NORTH-SOUTH NEXUS

46. OUR MAIN OBJECTIVES ARE TO AVOID SUPERPOWER MILITARY CONFRONTATION; TO PROTECT VITAL WESTERN STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS; AND TO PROMOTE MORE STABLE, HARMONIOUS AND EQUITABLE RELATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH. MORE BROADLY, WE SHOULD SEEK TO INSULATE TO THE DEGREE POSSIBLE

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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THIRD WORLD FROM THE EAST-WEST COMPETITION. SOVIET ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES BEAR HEAVILY ON EACH OF THESE WESTERN GOALS, BUT ARE FAR FROM THE KEY ELEMENT OF THE NORTH-SOUTH EQUATION. MOREOVER, THE WEST GENERALLY HOLDS THE HIGH CARDS VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW IN THE THIRD WORLD, BECAUSE ONLY WE HAVE THE CAPACITY TO BE RELEVANT TO THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ASPIRATIONS

OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS. THE SOVIETS CAN EXPLOIT THIRD WORLD GRIEVANCES AND MAKE GAINS TO THE EXTENT OUR POLICIES ARE UNSUCCESSFUL. SO FAR, MOSCOW HAS BEEN UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PLAY A BROADLY RESPONSIBLE ROLE. THE QUESTION, THEREFORE, IS WHETHER WE WILL PLAY OUR CARDS EFFECTIVELY, TO OUR OWN ADVANTAGE AND THAT OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

-- AVOIDING MILITARY CONFRONTATION

47. SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE THIRD WORLD IS FUNDAMENTALLY OPPORTUNISTIC AND INCREMENTALIST, DESIGNED TO ENHANCE MOSCOW'S INFLUENCE, STRATEGIC POSITION AND ROLE AS A GLOBAL POWER, AT THE EXPENSE OF THE WEST AND CHINA. IN RECENT YEARS, THE STEADY DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET GLOBAL NAVAL AND AIRLIFT CAPABILITY HAS ADDED A NEW DIMENSION TO SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE THIRD WORLD. MEASURED IN TERMS OF SOVIET MILITARY CAPACITY WHICH CAN BE BROUGHT TO BEAR, AND--IN AREAS LIKE THE MIDEAST AND PERSIAN GULF--OF INDIGENOUS MILITARY CAPABILITY, EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN THE THIRD WORLD HAS BECOME GREATLY MORE DANGEROUS.

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48. OUR OBJECTIVE IN THIS SITUATION SHOULD BE THE GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF AT LEAST GENERAL RULES OF THE GAME--A KIND OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL COMMON LAW--DESIGNED TO ENHANCE RESTRAINT FROM BOTH EAST AND WEST AND THUS TO CONFINE THE COMPETITION SHORT OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION. ENCOURAGING LDC'S TO POLICE THEIR OWN REGIONS, INCLUDING THROUGH REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, IS ONE WAY TO MINIMIZE EXTERNAL MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. IN SHORT, IN PARALLEL WITH OUR EFFORT IN ARMS CONTROL, WE ALSO NEED TO BRAKE THE ACTION/REACTION CYCLE IN EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN THIRD AREAS SHORT OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

49. THE SOVIETS GENERALLY SHARE OUR INTEREST IN AVOIDING MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD AND MAY HAVE GAINED SOME UNDERSTANDING THAT TRANSIENT SUCCESSES SUCH AS ANGOLA CAN COME AT HIGH COST IN TERMS OF WESTERN SUPPORT FOR DETENTE--INCLUDING MFN, CREDITS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. HOWEVER, THE COMPETITION FOR INFLUENCE IN THIRD AREAS WILL CONTINUE. THE RECENT PODGORNY AND CASTRO MISSIONS

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IN AFRICA REPRESENTED AN EFFORT BOTH TO COUNTER KISSINGER'S EARLIER SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY AND TO EXPLOIT THE STALEMATE AND CONSEQUENT FRUSTRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. TO THE EXTENT THAT WESTERN DIPLOMACY PROGRESSES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (OR THE MIDEAST) WITHOUT A VISIBLE SOVIET ROLE, WE CAN ASSUME CONTINUING SOVIET EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THAT PROGRESS. IN CRISIS AREAS, THEREFORE, THE TASK IS TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS DIPLOMATICALLY IN THE FORMAL PROCESS AND POLITICALLY IN

THE RESULTS, WHILE DENYING MOSCOW THE CAPACITY FOR AFFECTING THE SETTLEMENT IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO WESTERN INTERESTS OR REGIONAL STABILITY. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY TO THE MIDEAST, WHICH IS OF CRITICAL GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND WHERE MOSCOW PERCEIVES ITS VITAL INTERESTS TO BE DIRECTLY ENGAGED. IN SUCH SITUATIONS, A HIGH PREMIUM MUST BE PLACED ON TIMELY COMMUNICATION AND CONSULTATION SO THAT BOTH SIDES CAN CALCULATE READILY AND ACCUR-
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ATELY THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER AND THE LARGER STAKES INVOLVED.

50. WE SHOULD NOT LINK SOVIET CONDUCT IN THIRD AREAS (OR FOR THAT MATTER SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES) DIRECTLY TO VITAL SECURITY ISSUES SUCH AS SALT. THIS WOULD BE TO MAKE THE LATTER HOSTAGE TO A SHAKY FORTUNE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE EVIDENTLY IS A FACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOVIET CONDUCT IN THIRD WORLD CRISIS AREAS (AND SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES) AND OVERALL EAST/WEST RELATIONS. SOVIET ADVENTURISM IN THIRD AREAS OR BLATANT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OBVIOUSLY IMPACT NEGATIVELY ON WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, CREDITS, ETC. NONE OF THESE FACTORS ALONE CAN PREVENT ANOTHER ANGOLA IF THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED TO SEIZE A WIDE-OPEN OPPORTUNITY. BUT TOGETHER THEY REPRESENT SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET INTERESTS WHICH THE KREMLIN MUST KNOW COULD BE PUT AT RISK.

51. FINALLY, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY PERCEIVED COMMON INTERESTS AND ALLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS, OUR EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET RESTRAINT MIGHT BE COMPLEMENTED THROUGH ARMS CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. THESE COULD INCLUDE, ABOVE ALL, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER LIMITATIONS AND NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARD REGIMES.

-- PROTECTING VITAL WESTERN INTERESTS

52. EXTENSION OF SOVIET POSITIONS AND INFLUENCE COULD IMPAIR OUR ACCESS TO NATURAL RESOURCES AND RAW MATERIALS, RELATIONS WITH KEY COUNTRIES, AND INDEED THE OVERALL

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STRATEGIC BALANCE. SUBSTANTIAL SHIFTS IN KEY THIRD AREA POWER BALANCES ALSO COULD HAVE SIGNIFICANT DESTABILIZING EFFECTS IN THE SHORTER TERM, BY: (A) AFFECTING CHINA'S ASSESSMENT OF THE GLOBAL BALANCE AND, POTENTIALLY, CHINESE DEFENSE POLICIES AND RELATIONS WITH THE US AND USSR; CONFIDENTIAL

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(B) ENHANCING SOVIET HUBRIS, RISK-TAKING, AND MISCALCULATION IN THE MIDEAST, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND OTHER WORLD TROUBLE-SPOTS; AND (C) UNDERCUTTING THE OBJECTIVE CONDITIONS OF AND REQUISITE PUBLIC/PARLIAMENTARY SUPPORT FOR IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

53. WHILE THE MILITARY BALANCES IN EUROPE, EAST ASIA, AND THE MIDEAST REMAIN CENTRAL, THE REAL THREAT TO VITAL WESTERN INTERESTS IN THIRD AREAS LIES IN THE UNCERTAINTY, COMPLEXITY, AND DIVERGENT INTERESTS IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS RATHER THAN THE DANGER OF SOVIET PREDOMINANCE. IT IS EXACTLY IN THIS FIELD THAT THE WEST HOLDS A CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE OVER MOSCOW.

-- ADVANCING NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

54. THE SUBSTANCE OF CURRENT AND FUTURE NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES LIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER. WHAT IS CLEAR IN EAST-WEST TERMS HOWEVER, IS THE NEARLY TOTAL ABSENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE COMMUNIST STATES GENERALLY FROM THE EMERGING NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF MOSCOW AND PEKING TO THIRD WORLD MATERIAL ASPIRATIONS. IT IS THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WHICH TRANSFER 90 PERCENT OF ALL REAL RESOURCES GOING TO THE THIRD WORLD AND WHICH HAVE LED THE WAY IN UN PROGRAMS FOR TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND FOOD. THIS FACT IS OF EXTRAORDINARY IMPORTANCE FOR MOST LDC'S IN A PERIOD OF OMINOUSLY SWELLING THIRD WORLD DEBT. MOREOVER, ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, IT IS ONLY AMERICA AND ITS WESTERN ALLIES THAT CAN AND DO PLAY THE ROLE OF POLITICAL INTERMEDIARY IN THE KEY WORLD CRISIS AREAS OF THE MIDEAST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.

55. BURDENED BY THEIR OWN ECONOMIC INEFFICIENCY AND INDEBTEDNESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE OFFERED ONLY RHETORICAL SUPPORT OF LDC DEMANDS AND OCCASIONAL MILITARY AID FOR CONFIDENTIAL

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"LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" AND LEFTIST FACTIONS. BUT MOSCOW

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SO FAR HAS REMOVED ITSELF FROM ANY SUBSTANTIVE ROLE IN THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, BETTING INSTEAD THAT IT CAN CAPITALIZE ON ANTI-WESTERN SENTIMENT AND CAN PICK UP THE CHIPS FOLLOWING THE BREAKDOWN OF PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS.

56. THE RECONCILIATION OF NORTH-SOUTH INTERESTS IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN. THE PROBLEMS OF LDC ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION MAY BE SO ENORMOUS AS TO DEFY THE MOST CONSTRUCTIVE FEASIBLE WESTERN EFFORTS. EVEN IN THE SHORT-TERM, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET STRATEGY PRESENTS THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WITH A CONSIDERABLE OPPORTUNITY. IF THE WEST IS TO GAIN GREATER UNDERSTANDING FROM AND PROVE ABLE TO CHANNEL THE URGENT DEMANDS OF NATIONALISM AND A HOSTILE REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPING WORLD, IT MUST RESPOND POLITICALLY TO ASPIRATIONS FOR GREATER EQUITY WHILE PROMOTING A PROGRESSIVE, RESPONSIBLE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM. THE COST OF EVEN

MINIMUM, PROBABLE LDC EXPECTATIONS WILL STILL BE VERY HIGH. BUT THE COST OF MODERATE, RESPONSIVE GLOBAL REFORM IS LIKELY TO BE INFINITELY LESS THAN THE ALTERNATIVE FUTURE OF RISING WAVES OF REGIONAL UNREST AND REVOLUTION. AND, AS IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP, THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IS MORE LIKELY TO EMERGE, HOWEVER GRADUALLY, ONLY IN CONNECTION WITH A STEADY DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH.

57. A LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO DRAW THE SOVIETS GRADUALLY INTO A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THIS PROCESS, SEEKING TO EXPLOIT SOVIET CONCERN AT BEING EXCLUDED AND AT THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CHINA, OPEC, AND OTHER REGIONAL POWER CENTERS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL IN THIS CONNECTION TO REFER OCCASIONALLY TO OUR INTEREST IN DRAWING THE SOVIETS INTO A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENTIAL

MEASURES DEALING WITH SUCH GLOBAL PROBLEMS AS ECONOMIC AID, FOOD RESERVES, POLLUTION, ETC. IT IS IN THE WEST'S INTEREST TO SHIFT THE EAST-WEST COMPETITION IN THIRD AREAS FROM THE POLITICO-MILITARY TO THE ECONOMIC FIELD, WHERE WE ARE FAR SUPERIOR. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD EXERCISE CARE TO AVOID APPEARING TO MINIMIZE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED.

58. THIS TOPIC WAS CONSIDERED IN SOME DETAIL AT THE 1975 APAG MEETING, WHICH GENERALLY CONCLUDED THAT SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC BODIES WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF MOSCOW ACKNOWLEDGED THE RULES OF THE PARTICULAR INSTITUTION AND WAS PREPARED TO PLAY A

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CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. THESE PRECONDITIONS DO NOT NOW GENERALLY OBTAIN; NOR IS THERE ANY INDICATION OF DIRECT SOVIET INTEREST IN PARTICIPATION. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE ALERT TO APPROPRIATE INTERMEDIATE MEASURES OF COOPERATION WHICH MIGHT BE FEASIBLE AND THE CONCEPT HELPS TO GIVE A SENSE OF LONG-TERM POSITIVE DIRECTION TO OUR POLICY.

59. IF MOSCOW PERCEIVES NORTH-SOUTH ACCOMMODATION, IMPROVEMENTS IN US-CHINESE RELATIONS AND PROGRESS IN THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS, THE KREMLIN EITHER COULD SEEK TO PLAY THE SPOILER ROLE OR BECOME MORE ACCESSIBLE TO CO-OPTION AND COOPERATION. TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY ALLIED INTERESTS IN THE MIDEAST AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, WE SHOULD SEEK CAREFULLY TO INVOLVE THE USSR IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND THE MIDEAST PEACE PROCESS, WHILE AVOIDING POSSIBLE SOVIET EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THESE TWO CRUCIAL PROCESSES. IN THE LONG-TERM, HOWEVER, CO-OPTION OF MOSCOW IS A SAFER OBJECTIVE THAN EXCLUSION AND IRRELE-VANCE, WHICH WOULD ONLY BREED FRUSTRATION, ANGER, AND ADVENTURISM. CHRISTOPHER

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Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE105160
Document Source: CORE
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Subject: DISCUSSION PAPER FOR MAY 24-27 APAG MEETING - - - - - - - NATO APAG MEETING MAY 24-27, 1977 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - US DISCUSSION PAPER ON - - - -
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, EEWT, PARM, SHUM, US, XT, XH, NATO, APAG
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